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A PROPOSAL FOR A MODIFIED STANDARD OF CARE
FOR THE INFANT ENGAGED IN AN ADULT ACTIVITY
A trend can be discerned in recent case law, supported by legal
writers, to adopt the reasonable man standard to measure the conduct of
a minor engaged in an adult activity. This trend is premised upon the
elusive concepts of social desirability and public necessity. A review of
the cases and articles indicates that the trend has evolved without a proper
weighing by courts and writers of the equally elusive countervailing pol-
icy considerations that support the more traditional subjective standard
of care. These considerations suggest that the current trend should be
modified by a qualified union of the two standards so that the public
interest would be served without denying the child his day in court in
his true posture of childhood.
The Subjective Standard
Traditionally, courts have adopted a subjective standard of care for
determining the alleged primary or contributory negligence of a child.'
The adoption of this standard permits the court to weigh the child's age,
experience, and level of intelligence.2  Thus, the "ordinary care" required
of the child is that degree of care which children of the same age, experi-
ence, and intelligence are accustomed to exercise under like circumstances.'
1. See, e.g., Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 406, 407 (1829) ("Where infants are the
actors, that might probably be considered an unavoidable accident which would not be
so considered where the actors are adults. . . .") ; Keller v. Gaskill, 9 Ind. App. 670, 36
N.E. 303 (1894); Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 91-92, 130 N.V. 893, 894 (1911)
("The rule is that a child is only required to exercise that degree of care which the
great mass of children of the same age ordinarily exercise under the same circumstances,
taking into account the experience, capacity, and understanding of the child.")
2. See Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L.J. 618,
620 (1928) (the courts have named in diverse combinations the following qualities which
are to be individualized: age, ability, alertness, appreciation, capability, capacity, com-
prehension, discernment, discretion, development, education, experience,' intelligence,
judgment knowledge, maturity, reason, sex, understanding, age is included in all the
combinations."). See also Negligence-Standard of Care Required of a Child, 25 ILL.
L. r\v. 214 (1930); Mertz, The Infant and Negligence Per Se in Pennsylvania, 51 DICK.
L. REv. 79 (1946) ; Fleming, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
3. Contra, one early case espoused the view that the objective reasonable man
standard alone controls the measurement of infant care. Neal v. Gillett, 3 Conn. R. 436,
442 (1855) (the court approved a charge to the jury, "that inasmuch as the plaintiff
claimed to recover only his actual damages, the age of the defendant [a minor] was not
to be taken into account, by the jury, in determining the question of negli-
gence. . . ") ; a minority of decisions and writers advocates differentiating infant cases
by applying the subjective standard of care when contributory negligence is asserted
and the objective reasonable man standard when primary negligence is alleged. See
Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 173 N.W. 437 (1919); Dellewo v. Pearson, 259 Minn.
452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961) (the court recognized that there may be a difference be-
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The subjective standard of care involves a dual approach to infant
negligence that embraces both a subjective and an objective appraisal of
the child's conduct. As one author has concluded:
The mental capacity, the knowledge and experience of the par-
ticular child, are to be taken in consideration in each case. These
qualities are individualized-subjective--but only for the pur-
pose of determining whether or not the child was capable of
perceiving the risk of injury. . . . Beyond that, there is an
objective standard. In determining whether or not his conduct
was proper in view of his intelligence, knowledge, and experi-
ence, his conduct is to be compared with that of the careful and
prudent child of similar qualities . . . so in the case of infants,
the element of prudence is standardized.4
The application of the subjective standard of care establishes a
double standard: the manner by which a child's conduct is measured and
his liability is determined is different from that applied to an adult. The
tween the standard of care that is required of a child in protecting himself against
hazards and the standard that may be applicable when his activities expose others to
danger) ; Zuckerbrod v. Burch, 88 N.J. Super. 1, 8, 210 A.2d 425, 429 (1965) ("usually
a child needs less maturity . . . to foresee consequences of his own acts than to com-
prehend and avoid the danger created in whole or part by the acts or neglect of others.") ;
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 (1915) ("Every man, whether he is a stand-
ard man or not, is required to act as a standard man would. If by chance he is not such
a man, he may . . . make a mistake and act so as to be guilty of legal negligence,
though he has used all such care and forethought as he was capable of. In the case of
contributory negligence, there is an exception to this rule . . . [i.e.] children . . . are
not required to act like a standard man, but only to use such judgment as they are cap-
able of.").
The majoriy of authors and courts contend that no difference in principle exists be-
tween questions of primary negligence and questions of contributory negligence, and
that it is arbitrary and inconsistent to distinguish between the care demanded of an in-
fant in his own protection and that required of him in his conduct toward others. See,
e.g., Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 59 Am. L. REv. 864, 888
(1948) (such a distinction is "arbitrary and inconsistent") ; Longeteig, The Minor Mo-
torist-A Double Standard of Care, 2 IDAHO L. REV. 103 (1965) ; O'Neill, Torts: Stand-
ard of Care Applied to Minors in Operation of Dangerous Instrumentalities, 3 TULSA L.
Rzv. 186 (1966) ; Glover, Liability of an Infant of Tender Years for Primary Negli-
gence, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 332, 334 (1966) ("Illogical to afford an infant more favorable
treatment in cases where the issue is one of primary negligence than in cases involving
contributory negligence. . . . [I]t would be desirable to eliminate this needless di-
chotomy. . . ."); PROSSER, TORTS § 32 (3d ed. 1964); Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84
N.H. 501, 153 Atl. 457 (1931) ; Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Ore. 426, 446, 374 P.2d 896, 905
(1962) (immaterial whether the child is plaintiff or defendant).
4. Shulman, supra note 2, at 625; see 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 16.8 (1956);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 283A (1965) ; O'Neil, supra note 3, at 187; Keltch v.
Strunk, 295 P.2d 785 (Okla. 1956) ; Chernotik v. Schrank, 76 S.D. 374, 79 N.W.2d 4
(1956) ; Cleveland Park Club v. Tere, 165 A.2d 485 (D.C. 1960) ; Overlock v. Ruede-
mann, 147 Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960) ; Wittmeir v. Post, 78 S.D. 520, 105 N.W.2d
65 (1960); Coleman v. Baker, 382 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1964); Burhans v. Witbeck, 375
Mich. 253, 134 N.W.2d 225 (1965); Kelley v. Brian, 415 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1966).
406
A PROPOSAL
conduct of the adult is measured against the single objective standard
of a "reasonable man," whereas that of the minor is gauged first by a
subjective standard and second by the objective standard of a "reasonable
child" of equivalent age, experience, and intelligence.5 This judicial dis-
tinction between adult and child gains support from the principle that the
law of torts neither protects all interests from invasion nor attaches lia-
bility to every activity merely because it causes harm.6
It has been suggested that in practical application the subjective
standard, with its dual approach, has stronger overtones of subjectivity
than of objectivity.' One cannot estimate to what extent the subjective
standard unduly influences jurors nor how many litigants have suf-
fered unusually harsh judgments as a result of the jury's application
of the subjective standard. A review of the cases suggests that the triers
of fact are often drawn to the child's cause upon hearing: "the law does
not presume the same capacity as an adult to appreciate the dangers of a
known condition. The jury has the right to judge the child's conduct by
a lesser standard of care. . . ."' A comparison of three exemplary cases
illustrates the risk of over-subjectivity inherent in the application of the
subjective standard.
All three cases presented the question whether a minor defendant's
misconduct was willful and wanton under guest statutes. In Chernotik v.
Schrank, the South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was
not sufficient to take the case to the jury. The court reasoned that a
sixteen-year-old could not have been conscious that driving 50 to 60 miles
per hour on a country gravel road in violation of parental instruction
would result in serious harm. In Mosconi v. Ryan,"9 a California court
held that a sixteen-year-old defendant did not have an appreciation of the
danger involved in driving 70 to 80 miles per hour on a heavily traveled
road that was eighteen feet wide and marked with "bad curve" signs. In
5. Normally, the question of an infant's liability is for jury determination unless
the conclusion is so evident from the facts that reasonable minds could not differ as to
the answer. See Laidlow v. Baker, 78 Idaho 67, 297 P.2d 287 (1956) (authorizes a non-
suit or directed verdict where there is no other reasonable interpretation of the evi-
dence); Burhans v. Witbeck, 375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W.2d 225 (1965) (normally ca-
pacity is a question of fact for the jury) ; Zuckerbrod v. Burch, 88 N.J. Super. 1, 210
A.2d 425 (1965) (if reasonable men could not disagree, the judge then decides the ques-
tion of capacity as a matter of law) ; Donohue v. Rolando, 16 Utah 2d 294, 400 P.2d 12
(1965) (unless a child is so young as to require the court to judicially know that he is
not responsible for his act, or he is so mature that the court must know that though a
minor, he is responsible).
6. Dunlop, Torts Relating to Infants, 5 W. ONT. L. Rav. 116 (1966).
7. O'Neill, supra note 3, at 187.
8. Coleman v. Baker, 382 S.W.2d 843, 848 (Ky. 1964).
9. 76 S.D. 374, 79 N.W.2d 4 (1956).
10. 94 Cal. App. 2d 227, 210 P.2d 259 (1949).
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the third case, Sheets v. Pendergrast,1" the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld a finding that a seventeen-year-old had been grossly negligent in
turning her head to talk with friends in the back seat while negotiating
a gradual curve in the highway. The decision held that the minor, in
view of her age, experience, and intelligence, had the capacity to perceive
that her conduct could likely result in harm, and that a reasonable child
of equal perception would not have conducted himself in this manner
under like circumstances.
When the facts of the three cases are compared and the results con-
trasted, it would seem that the plaintiffs in the first two cases were vic-
tims of over-subjectivity, while the Sheets decision reflects less subjec-
tivity and seemingly illustrates the proper application of the subjective
standard. 2
Notwithstanding the inherent problem of over-subjectivity in the
subjective standard, many jurisdictions have clung to its application.
Courts and legal periodicals have offered several reasons in justification
of a subjective standard for minors. The most potent argument in favor
of retaining the subjective standard is based on the elusive precepts of
justice and fairness. The argument is that a minor cannot logically be
expected to exercise the same degree of care as the mythical reasonable
and prudent man. To exact of the infant an adult standard of care for
the protection of his own safety or the safety of others would be to re-
quire him to exceed his capabilities and to exercise reason he does not
have. One author has observed that the law "would shut its eyes, ostrich
like, to the facts of life and to burden unduly the child's growth to ma-
jority,"13 if it did not recognize the subjective standard.
It has also been argued that the subjective standard permits a child
to develop skills without the apprehension of severe legal reprisals.
Further, the utilization of the subjective standard to measure a child's
conduct emphasizes individualization and thereby gives greater probity
to the fault principle by narrowing the gap between legal and moral fault."4
Also it might be argued that legal recognition of the infirmities of
youth has not been limited to issues of negligence. For example, con-
11. 106 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1960).
12. It is of interest to note that since Mosconi v. Ryan, the California courts have
joined the growing ranks which advocate application of the reasonable man standard to
minors engaged in adult activities. Prichard v. Veterans Cab Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 904, 408
P.2d 360, (1965) (general rule on a child's standard of care does not apply where a
minor engages in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults).
13. Shulman, supra note 2, at 618. See Carbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153
Atl. 457 (1931) ; cases cited note 11 supra.
14. Fleming, supra note 2, at 554.
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tract,1 agency,16 and criminal law17 acknowledge that infants are not
capable of exercising the same judgment as adults. Even other sectors
of tort law extend special treatment to the minor, as exemplified by the
"attractive nuisance doctrine."1 8
The Changing View
The few early decisions involving child negligence arose out of play
accidents. In these decisions, little opposition was offered to the appli-
cation of the subjective standard, since prior to the twentieth century lia-
bility insurance was uncommon and as a consequence most children were
execution proof." It has been suggested that this factor underlies the
view that since infants are not responsible for their youth and immatur-
ity they are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with their
age, intelligence, and experience.2"
At the time of the formulation of the subjective standard, there was
no instrumentality so readily available to minors or so potentially destruc-
tive as the automobile. The automobile is no longer reserved by prac-
tice, mores, or law to adults. Children, teenagers in particular, are con-
stantly expanding into adult fields of conduct. No longer are the pene-
trations of youth into adult activities tentative and experimental; rather
they are constant and consistent. As a consequence of the high percentage
of infant automobile accidents2' and the great increase in liability insur-
ance protection, many courts have reconsidered the social desirability of
the subjective standard and have adopted the view that while infants are
entitled
to be judged by standards commensurate with their age, experi-
ence and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their
age, experience and wisdom, it would be unfair to the public to
permit a minor in the operation of a motor vehicle to observe
any other standard of care and conduct than those expected of
others.2
Thus,
the age of a minor who operates a motor vehicle will not excuse
him from liability for driving it in a negligent manner, and he
15. RE TATEmENT, CoNRAcTs §§ 376, 431, comment b (1932).
16. SEAry, AGENCY §§ 14B, C (1964).
17. 21 Am. JuR. 2D Crinial Law § 27 (1965).
18. PROSSF, TORTS § 59 (3d ed. 1964).
19. Fleming, supra note 2, at 555.
20. Bohlen, supra note 3, at 886.
21. NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1966).
22. Dellewo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (1961).
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will be required to meet the standard established primarily for
adults.2"
Dissatisfaction with the subjective standard has resulted in a divi-
sion of authority as to the standard to be required of a minor engaging
in an adult activity. The Restatement24 adopts the view that where an in-
fant engages in an activity "which is normally undertaken only by adults
and for which adult qualifications are required," he can no longer take
advantage of his age and infirmities but is to be judged in accordance
with the standard of conduct applied to an adult.
The argument in support of a uniform adult standard of care is
founded partially upon an evaluation of social necessity. It has been
argued that the current trend to adopting the adult standard is an equit-
able reaction to the disproportionate increase in accidents by minors.2
When a minor assumes responsibility for the operation of
so potentially dangerous an instrument as an automobile, he
should "put off the things of a child" and assume responsibility
f or its careful and safe operation in the light of adult standards.
The socially desirable policy of protecting infants from losses
attributable to their lack of reason and experience should give
way to the more necessary policy of making our highways as
safe for the motoring public as the law can reasonably make
them.2
6
If a child who engages in an adult activity cannot comprehend pro-
spectively the hazards he creates, it certainly cannot be assumed that the
application of a more stringent standard of care will deter him from im-
23. Prichard v. Veterans Cab Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 904, 907, 408 P.2d 360, 363 (1965) ;
accord, Ryan v. C & D Motor Delivery, 38 Ill. App. 2d 18, 186 N.E.2d 156 (1956) (a
minor should be held to the same standard of care as an adult when operating a vehicle) ;
Wilson v. Schumate, 296 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1956) ; Betzold v. Erickson, 35 Ill. App. 2d
203, 182 N.E.2d 342 (1962) (standard of care for minor motorist is that standard of
care required and expected of adult licensed drivers) ; Carano v. Cardina, 115 Ohio App.
30, 184 N.E.2d 430 (1961) ; Nielsen v. Brown, 232 Ore. 426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962) (logi-
cal and salutary to judge the behavior of children by the same standard that is applied to
adults) ; Dawson v. Hoffman, 43 Ill. App. 2d 17, 192 N.E.2d 695 (1963) ; Allen v. Ellis,
191 Kan. 311, 380 P.2d 408 (1963) ; Harrelson v. Whitehead, 263 Ark. 325, 365 S.W.2d
868 (1963) (no valid distinction between a vehicle driven by a minor and one driven by
an unexperienced or reckless adult); Wagner v. Shanks, 194 A.2d 701 (Del. 1963)
(judge the behavior of minors by the adult standard) ; Adams v. Lopez, 75 N.M. 503,
407 P.2d 50 (1965).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 283A, comment c (1965). See 2 HARPER &
JAMES, TORTS 131 (1957) ; Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 872, 876 (1964).
25. O'Neill, supra note 3, at 192.
26. Longeteig, supra note 3, at 111; see Negligence-Application of Adult Standard
to Minor, 33 TENN. L. REV. 533 (1966).
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prudence." Therefore, the prime purpose for imposing a more exacting
standard for measuring child conduct is to assure that fewer injuries will
go uncompensated rather than to deter minors from creating hazards. A
greater number of injuries will be redressed by the application of a uni-
form adult standard of care because most states have legislation imput-
ing the negligence of the minor to the parent, guardian, or vehicle owner,
who usually carry liability insurance. It is probable that if the conduct
of the minor defendants in the Chernotik v. Schrank2" and Mosconi v.
Ryan"0 cases had been gauged against the standard of the reasonable man
the results would have been different.
The uniform adult standard has also been justified by statutory con-
struction. Most legislative enactments governing the operation of ve-
hicles provide that "every person" or "all persons" are subject to the pro-
visions of the statute."0 Many courts have interpreted this broad termin-
ology to mean that the legislatures intend minors as well as adults to be
subject to the rules of the road. By this construction, a child's violation
of a statute is held to be negligent per se since he has not met the standard
of care which the legislature demands of all motorists."' Thus, litigation
involving a minor's alleged violation of a statute does not turn upon
whether the child has the capacity to perceive the risks occasioned by his
conduct, but whether his actual conduct has violated the standard of care
statutorily required.
In addition to the rules of the road, licensing statutes have provided
support for the courts' application of a uniform adult standard. It has
been argued that it would be paradoxical to hold an adult to a strictly ob-
jective standard and to hold a minor, engaged in the same activity, to a
different and less exacting standard, when they presumably are equally
capable since both met the same objective requirements for obtaining a
license.32
In Ewing v. Biddle,3 the Indiana Appellate Court recently adopted
27. Longeteig, supra note 3, at 105 (although fewer injuries will go uncompensated,
it is recognized that a change in standards will probably have little effect upon the mi-
nor's driving habits).
28. 76 S.D. 374, 79 N.W.2d 4 (1956).
29. 94 Cal. App. 2d 227, 210 P.2d 259 (1949).
30. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2019 (Burns 1965 Supp.).
31. Powell v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1966) ; Contra,
Morris, Relation of Criinial Statute to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453, 469 (1933) ;
Mertz, supra note 2, at 92 (a decision declaring an infant per se negligent on a violation
of a statute can only be rationalized and supported by strong policy reasons which go
beyond the ordinary bases and reasons justifying the use of negligence per se).
32. O'Neill, supra note 3, at 192.
33. 216 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. App. 1966). Other recent decisions adopting the uniform
adult standard are: Daniels v. Evans, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2276 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1966) (over-
rules landmark decision of Carbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 AtI. 457 (1931), to
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the uniform adult standard, reasoning that:
To give legal sanction to the operation of automobiles, bicycles
or any other motor driven vehicle by a minor or teenager, with
less than ordinary care, for the safety of others would be im-
practical as well as dangerous. If the rule were otherwise, a
state of uncertainty would result, because then it would be a
question for juries and courts to determine whether minors of
various ages would be held to a different standard of care than
adults and all others.
In this modem day we must take judicial notice of the
hazards of traffic, and travelers must not be forced to anticipate
conduct other than that expected of all ordinary citizens. 4
The court further supported its decision on the ground that Indiana
statutes governing rules of the road do not specifically exempt anyone
from their provisions, and therefore minors are within their purview.
Notwithstanding this decision to require a child to meet an adult
standard for reason of social desirability, the Indiana court, by obiter
dictum, still acknowledged that a youth does not normally possess an
adult's capacity for judgment. The court announced that an adult mo-
torist owes "a certain degree of care if he or she knows that a young
person might be driving or operating a vehicle ... ,
Resolution
Whether the conduct of a minor engaged in an adult activity should
be measured by the subjective standard or by the objective reasonable
man standard turns on the ultimate issue whether courts should continue
to recognize that children normally do not have the same capacity for
judgment as an adult, or should subordinate this factor, as the court did
in Ewing v. Biddle,36 to the protection of the public interest and require
a child to meet an adult standard of care.
One author, 7 in recognizing the difficulty of selecting between the
subjective standard and the reasonable man standard, concludes that the
the extent that a child's conduct, when engaged in an adult activity, will be judged by an
adult standard for reasons of public safety and expressed legislative policy) ; Powell v.
Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727, (Tenn. 1966) (under the changed and
existing circumstances which now prevail, a minor engaged in the operation of a motor
vehicle should be held to an adult standard of care).
34. 216 N.E.2d at 867. The Indiana court, not unlike others, implies that the ap-
plication of an adult standard to a minor will deter imprudence; this implication is ques-
tionable. See note 27 supra.
35. Ibid.
36. 216 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. App. 1966).
37. Dunlop, supra, note 6.
A PROPOSAL
"better position, in view of the availability of liability insurance, is that
the child should be held to the standard of an adult.""8  Through insur-
ance, "you slip between the horns of the dilemma," since "you do not
have to leave the loss upon the victim of substandard conduct, which
would seem unfair, nor do you have to shift the loss to the substandard
actor who just was not capable of acceptable [adult] conduct, which
would also seem unfair." 9  This does not constitute a resolution of the
problem, but rather a circumlocution of it. Furthermore, not all children
are insured. Not all children can qualify for insurance coverage. Nor
can the insurer's position be ignored, since in the last analysis the in-
creasing cost of insurance protection is borne by the insured public.
In a majority of child negligence cases involving adult activity, judg-
ments would be the same regardless of the standard adopted if the risk of
over-subjectivity could be eliminated from the subjective standard. Thus,
barring excessive subjectivity by the judge or jury, in most cases the sub-
jective standard would be as responsive as the reasonable man standard
to the public interest in compensating for negligently inflicted injuries
as Sheets v. Pendergrast° demonstrates.
The selection of one standard over the other to measure the conduct
of a minor engaged in adult activity often leads to a harsh result, as ex-
emplified in the Chernotik v. Schrank4" and Mosconi v. Rya 43 decisions.
Since both standards are supported by equally tenable arguments and by
equally regarded authorities, reason suggests that a reconciliation of the
conflicting policy considerations can be effected by a merger of the two
standards. The dual objectives of providing compensation for injuries
inflicted by minors engaged in adult activity and of avoiding the inequity
of holding children, without exception, to an adult standard could be
achieved by adopting a rebuttable presumption that a minor engaged in
adult activity is capable of meeting an adult standard. The presumption
of adult capacity is in accord with human experience and probability43
since most children old enough to engage in adult activities such as operat-
38. Id. at 118.
39. Id. at 119.
40. 106 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1960).
41. 76 S.D. 374, 79 N.W.2d 4 (1956).
42. 94 Cal. App. 2d 227, 210 P.2d 259 (1949).
43. Jurisdictions which recognize that children after a certain age are presumably
capable of adult discretion: Georgia: Lassiter v. Poss, 85 Ga. App. 785, 70 S.F-2d 411
(1952) ; Pennsylvania: Zernell v. Miley, 417 Pa. 17, 208 A.2d 264 (1965) ; Texas: see
note 46 infra; Utah: see note 44 infra. These jurisdictions do not limit the use of the
presumption of adult capacity to cases involving children engaged in adult activities but
assume that a child of fourteen years of age and over is capable of meeting the reason-
able man standard of care in all activities. In City of Austin v. Hoffman, 379 S.W.2d
103 (Tex. 1964), the Texas court also indicated that it would apply the adult stand-
ard to any child regardless of age when engaged in an adult activity.
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ing an automobile are old enough to be presumed to possess "discretion
and physical capacity consistent with . . . the presumption of adult re-
sponsibility. . . ."" The potential harm that would result from negli-
gent conduct in such activities is not so obscure that it is hidden from all
but the most discerning eyes.
The presumption of adult capacity would be rebutted when the child
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not possess the
presumed capacity.45 Thus, adult capacity would be presumed unless and
until it could "be shown that the child is wanting in discretion or laboring
under the handicap of some mental disability" ;46 less evidence would not
support a finding that a child engaging in adult activity did not possess
adult discretion." In the exceptional case where the child sustains such
a burden, the traditional subjective standard of conduct would apply,
and the issue would be whether the child displayed that degree of care
which children of the same age, experience, and intelligence are accus-
tomed to exercise under similar circumstances.
Traditionally, rebuttable presumptions have been created
(a) to furnish an escape from anotherwise inescapable dilemma
I .. , (b) to require the litigant to whom information as to the
facts is more easily accessible to make them known, (c) to make
more likely a finding in accord with the balance of probability,
or (d) to encourage a finding consonant with the judicial judg-
ment as to, sound social policy.4"
Utilization of the rebuttable presumption of adult capacity is justified
since it accords with probability and provides the courts with an escape
from the dilemma of selecting one standard over the other when both are
supported by equally tenable arguments and authorities and either stand-
ing alone could lead to an inequitable result. This presumption repre-
senting a qualified union of the subjective and adult standards reduces the
opportunity for an over-subjective decision; it serves the public interest
without denying the child his day in court in his true posture.
44. Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 99 Utah 129, 134, 104 P.2d 225, 228 (1940).
45. If less than a preponderance of evidence is required to rebut the presumption
of adult capacity, the public interest in compensating negligently inflicted injuries might
be subordinated in practical effect to the policy considerations supporting the application
of the subjective standard.
46. City of Austin v. Hoffman, 379 S.W.2d 103, 107 (Tex. 1964). See Renegar v.
Cramer, 354 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
47. A lack of discretion might be evidenced by the child's age, lack of experience,
education, or intelligence. It is difficult to visualize a situation where a licensed minor
motorist could demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not as cap-
able as an adult of perceiving the hazards inherent in misconduct behind the wheel.
48. Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47
HARV. L. REv. 59, 77 (1933). See generally McCoRmIcK,, EVIDENCE 309 (1954).
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The inherent risk of over-subjectivity in the subjective standard
might be eliminated by proper instruction to the jury on the effect of the
adult presumption. Only in the rare situation where the child could re-
but the presumption of adult capacity would the subjective standard apply
to measure the conduct of a minor engaged in an activity normally re-
served to adults.
